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I. Introduction
The foundation of modern contract law began in the nineteenth century
and was based on the principle that any economic benefit given away by
someone should not go uncompensated.1 During the same century, principles
of contract law developed from dispute resolution relating to the enforcement
and interpretation of contracts.2 Contracts and their enforcement are essential
to any society.3 Without the function of a contract, the fundamental fabric of
society begins to break down.4 Contract development is taken very seriously due
to the necessity of contracts to the fabric of society and the high costs involved in
drafting them.5
As society progresses, the development of contract law within that society
also changes.6 This progression and further development of contract law leads
* J.D. candidate, University of Wyoming College of Law, Class of 2018.
Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Embedded Influences
into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 839, 843 (1999).
1

2

John Edward Murray, Murray on Contracts § 8 (5th ed. 2011).

3

Corbin on Contracts § 10.1 (Joseph M. Perillo, rev. ed. 2016).

4

Corbin, supra note 3, § 12.1.

5

Tina L. Stark et al., Negotiating and Drafting Contract Boilerplate § 12.1 (2003).

K. M. Sharma, From “Sanctity” to “Fairness”: An Uneasy Transition in the Law of Contracts,
18 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Int’l Comp. L. 95, 96 – 8 (1999).
6
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to additional complexity in drafting contracts.7 Some argue that the complexity
of contract drafting is “because of the uncertainty about the contractual
environment.”8 Therefore, as the future of contract law varies, the complexity of
contracts increases.9 A court’s interpretation of any contract, based on the rules of
contract interpretation and relevant policy considerations, influences this entire
process.10 Specifically, judicial uncertainty can add to the amount of complexity
in drafting contracts.11
A perfect example of this can be found in the case Pope v. Rosenberg.12 In this
case, the co-owner of an accounting firm sold her business to a buyer, and the
contract for the sale included a covenant not to compete (CNC).13 The CNC
in this case, prohibited the co-owners from working for any of the firm’s clients,
with accompanying conditions, for five years.14 However, after the sale, one of
the firm’s most prominent clients dropped the firm’s services and employed the
former co-owner prior to the completion of the five-year period.15 Based on this
employment and the specific services provided by the former co-owner to the
prior client, the new owner of the firm withheld the payment on its promissory
note to the previous owner.16 In the resulting litigation, both the district court
and the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the prior co-owner, Rosenberg, did
not violate the CNC clause of the contract.17 The Wyoming Supreme Court based
its holding on its interpretation of the contract, specifically the phrase “client
of the practice” and how the definition of the word “is” caused that phrase to
be interpreted.18
The Wyoming Supreme Court’s holding in Pope v. Rosenberg unnecessarily
added complications to the drafting of CNC clauses by interpreting around
the clear language of a CNC in the sale of a business.19 While seemingly
7

Sharma, supra note 5, at 112.

Karen Eggleston, Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts 1, 13 (John M. Olin Program
in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 93, 2000), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1452&context=law_and_economics.
8

9

Id.

10

See id. at 26.

11

Id. at 27.

12

Pope v. Rosenberg, 2015 WY 142, ¶ 36, 361 P.3d 824, 835 (Wyo. 2015).

Id. ¶ 4, 361 P.3d at 827. The term CNC is synonymous with non-compete agreements,
anti-competitive clause or anything else that would denote an agreement for one party to refrain
from competing with another in an industry for a geographical and chronological defined period.
13

14

Id, 361 P.3d at 827.

15

Id. ¶¶ 6 – 8, at 827–28.

16

Id. ¶ 11, 362 P.3d at 828.

17

Id. ¶ 36, 361 P.3d at 834.

18

Id. ¶ 33, 361 P.3d at 832– 33.

19

Pope, ¶ 36, 361 P.3d at 834.
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inconsequential, this added complexity extends to the level of commerce in which
CNCs are necessary by deterring transactions that require CNCs.20 Section I of
this note provides an introduction to the formation and usefulness of CNCs.21
Section II of this note develops the history of CNCs and the adoption of them
by courts.22 Specifically, Section II will explore the adoption of CNCs abroad and
in the United States, as well as the function of CNCs in Wyoming.23 The case,
Pope v. Rosenberg, is discussed in Section III, including the court’s analysis and
holding.24 Section IV discusses the court’s holding as it relates to the proposed
ramifications of its holding.25 More narrowly, this section will examine how the
court incorrectly focused on the interpretation of the CNC to skirt the clear
language.26 The section concludes with a discussion of the ramifications of the
holding in the case, Pope v. Rosenberg, as it relates to the practice of law for
attorneys in Wyoming.27

II. Background
CNCs can be a highly beneficial aspect of any contract with the purpose of
protecting certain business interests.28 A CNC can open the door for business
transactions that otherwise would not take place.29 For example, if a person
seeks to invest in an employee’s education but is concerned that the employee
might take the education that is received to a competitor, a CNC can relieve that
apprehension by nullifying that possibility.30 However, CNCs in contracts must
meet certain requirements and can be difficult to construct, therefore, sometimes
they are invalidated by courts.31

20

See infra note 155 and accompanying text.

21

See supra notes 2–27 and accompanying text.

22

See infra notes 28–46 and accompanying text.

23

See infra notes 28–46 and accompanying text.

24

See infra notes 47– 89 and accompanying text.

25

See infra notes 90–148 and accompanying text.

26

See infra notes 90–148 and accompanying text.

27

See infra notes 90–148 and accompanying text.

Glenn S. Draper, Enforcing Lawyers’ Covenants not to Compete, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 161, 164
(1994); Francis M. Dougherty, Enforceability of Sale-of-Business Agreement not to Compete Against
Nonsigner or Nonowning Signer, 60 A.L.R. 4th 294, § 2(a) (1988); Jonathan L. Sulds, 1-4 New
York Employment Laws § 4.03 (2d ed. 2016).
28

29
Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete As the Legal Infrastructure for
Innovation, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 251, 253 (2015).
30

Id. at 253.

See Kenneth J. Vanko, “You’re Fired! And Don’t Forget Your Non-Compete . . .”: The
Enforceability of Restrictive Covenants in Involuntary Discharge Cases, 1 DePaul Bus, & Comm. L.J.
1, 3 (2002) (giving the requirements for a typical CNC to be valid).
31
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A. Covenants not to Compete
Early in the development of CNCs, courts viewed them as invalid restrictions
on trade.32 One of the first cases involving a CNC dealt with a master dyer and an
apprentice.33 In their agreement, the apprentice agreed to avoid practicing in the
master’s town for six months.34 This case is dated 1414, and the court ultimately
refused to issue the injunction sought, suggesting the CNC was illegal.35 After
several more cases involving this issue, CNCs remained invalid for approximately
two hundred more years.36 Two economic factors that contributed to this view at
the time were “medieval apprenticeship systems” and a “deep labor shortage . . .”
both of which influenced courts in their analyses of CNCs.37
As the apprenticeship system gave way to the market economy, the idea
that individuals are free to contract gained momentum.38 This led to a case in
1711, Mitchel v. Reynolds, which began the recognition of CNCs.39 Interestingly,
Mitchel also involved the transfer of interests in a business, a bakery, in which
the transferor agreed not to compete within a geographical region with the
transferee.40 The Mitchel Court determined that the test for CNC clauses was the
reasonableness of the clause, and this test was adopted in the United States in a
similar manner.41 Today, CNCs are becoming more prominent, especially in postemployment contracts as they relate to the upper management of a company.42

B. Wyoming Covenants not to Compete
In Wyoming, the reasonableness test, which a majority of states adopted,
applies to CNCs.43 Specifically, the Wyoming courts apply Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 188, which states:
Cathy Packer & Johanna Cleary, Rediscovering the Public Interest: An Analysis on the Common
Law Governing Post-Employment Non-Compete Contracts for Media Employees, 24 Cardozo Arts &
Ent. L.J. 1073, 1073, 1078 (2007).
32

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Id.

37

Id. at 1079 –1080.

See id. at 1080–81 (“[CNCs] social architecture changed as England’s economic system
changed.”).
38

39

Id. at 1081.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 1082.

Mark A. Glick et al., The Law and Economics of Post-Employment Covenants: A Unified
Framework, 11 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 357, 357 (2002).
42

Christopher D. Goble, You Can’t Take it With You: Enforcing Noncompetition Agreements
Between Law Firms and Withdrawing Attorneys, 30 Land & Water L. Rev. 179, 184 (1995). The
43
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A promise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint
that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship
is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater
than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the
promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises
imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or
relationship include the following: (a) a promise by the seller of a
business not to compete with the buyer in such a way as to injure
the value of the business sold; (b) a promise by an employee or
other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal;
(c) a promise by a partner not to compete with the partnership.44
In Wyoming, although there have been some variations to the weight of the
factors which render a CNC invalid, the reasonableness principle has remained
constant.45 Any CNC found unreasonable by a court in Wyoming, whether for
employment or the sale of a business, is invalid.46 With this premise in mind, this
case note will discuss Pope v. Rosenberg.

III. Principle Case
A. Factual Background
In Pope v. Rosenberg, Rosenberg and her partner both owned an accounting
firm, which they contracted to sell to Pope.47 The parties completed the transaction
and Rosenberg provided financing, in part, through a promissory note from
Pope for the sale.48 In the contract to sell, Pope executed a CNC clause.49 This
clause prohibited:

first Wyoming case dealing with covenants not to compete involved a dispute in an employment
contract for a mechanical repair shop. Ridley v. Krout, 63, Wyo. 252, 252, 180 P.2d 124, 125 (Wyo.
1947). In this case, the court articulates the reasonableness test for which it analyzes covenants not
to compete. Id. at 127.
of

44
Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d 531, 540 (Wyo. 1993); Restatement (Second)
Contracts § 188 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).

45
See e.g., Pope v. Rosenberg, 2015 WY 142, ¶ 18, 361 P.3d 824, 829 (Wyo. 2015); Oliver
v. Ouwyn, 2013 WY 70, ¶ 8, 303 P.3d 1119, 1123 (Wyo. 2013); Restatement (Second) of
Contracts § 188 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).
46
See Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic, 861 P.2d 531, 540 (Wyo. 1993); Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 188 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).
47

Pope v. Rosenberg, 2015 WY 142, ¶ 3, 361 P.3d 824, 826 (Wyo. 2015).

48

Id.

49

Id. ¶ 4, 361 P.3d at 826–27.
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. . . For a period of five (5) consecutive years from the closing
date, the seller . . . agrees to not directly nor indirectly:
A. Compete with the buyer or engage in the practice of
public accounting within 100 miles of the present
location of the practice purchased;
B. Aid or assist anyone else, except buyer, to do so within
these limits;
C. Solicit in any manner or provide any public accounting
services for any past or present clients or solicit or hire
any employees of the practice;
D. Have any interest in a public accounting practice within
these limits;
E. Request or advise any present or future clients to
withdraw or cancel its business with the buyer.
...
Nothing contained herein is intended to prohibit the seller from
employment as a controller, bookkeeper, CFO, Treasurer, or
similar function with a private company or government entity,
so long as it is not a client of the practice.50
Upon transferring the accounting firm to Pope, Rosenberg placed her certified
public accountant (CPA) license on hold presuming that she would no longer
require the use of the license.51 After the sale, one of the firm’s clients, a fire district
(District), withdrew its business from the firm.52 This same client hired Rosenberg
as an office administrator.53 Rosenberg, then, reinstated her CPA license, allegedly,
to make her signature on documents appear more official in her capacity as the
District’s office manager.54 Admittedly, Rosenberg began performing a role as an
accountant for the District, which would constitute a breach of the CNC if the
District was still a client of the original accounting firm.55

50

Id. ¶ 4, 361 P.3d at 827.

51

Id. ¶ 5, 361 P.3d at 827.

52

Id. ¶ 6, 361 P.3d at 827.

53

Id. ¶ 5, 361 P.3d at 827.

54

Id. ¶ 10, 361 P.3d at 828.

55

Id. ¶ 24, 361 P.3d at 831.
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After realizing the extent of Rosenberg’s employment with the District, Pope
withheld payment on the promissory note based on a clause in the contract that
allowed Pope to do so upon a breach.56 Since Pope withheld payment, Rosenberg
filed a suit to enforce the promissory note.57 The district court found that
Rosenberg did not breach the CNC, based on its interpretation of the contractual
agreement.58 Specifically, the district court found the work that Rosenberg was
performing for the District fell within an exception in the CNC; therefore, the
court granted summary judgment for Rosenberg.59 Pope appealed to the Wyoming
Supreme Court.60

B. Court’s Analysis and Holding
The Wyoming Supreme Court began its analysis by distinguishing the
different level of scrutiny for CNCs with respect to employment contracts
and CNCs in the sale of businesses.61 The court clarified that CNCs in the
sale of businesses are less strictly analyzed for validity based on the presumed
sophistication level of the parties to the sale.62 However, the court added that
CNCs in the sale of a business must still be reasonable.63 In this case, the facts fail
to clarify whether this is an employment CNC or a CNC involving the sale of a
business.64 The court’s analysis, however, indicates that it treated this as a CNC
involving the sale of a business.65
After stating the premises for the validity of CNCs, the court determined that
the entire ruling hinged on the definition of the phrase “client of the practice.”66
The issue was whether the definition of “client of the practice” only prohibited
Rosenberg’s employment with current clients of the practice, or if the prohibition
also extended to any entity that had previously been a client of the firm.67 The
court, then, proceeded to interpret the contract, specifically the CNC clause.68
The court listed the rules for contract interpretation, which included: (1) applying
the “meaning which that language would convey to reasonable persons at the time
56

Id. ¶ 11, 361 P.3d at 828.

57

Id. ¶¶ 11–12, 361 P.3d at 828.

58

Id. ¶ 13, 361 P.3d at 828.

59

Id. 361 P.3d at 828.

60

Id. ¶ 14, 361 P.3d at 829.

61

Id. ¶¶ 16 –18, 361 P.3d at 829.

62

Id. ¶ 17, 361 P.3d at 829.

63

Id. ¶ 18, 361 P.3d at 829.

64

See id. ¶ 18, 361 P.3d at 829.

65

See id. ¶ 19, 361 P.3d at 830.

66

Id. ¶ 25, 361 P.3d at 831.

67

Id. 361 P.3d at 831.

68

Id. 361 P.3d at 831.
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and place of its use,” (2) reading the document as a whole and using other parts
of the document to interpret itself, and (3) avoiding an interpretation of any
provision of the contract that would render another provision meaningless.69
Using a de novo standard of review, the court first found that the type of job
that Rosenberg undertook was within the exception laid out in the last provision
of the CNC, if she was not doing work for a “client of the practice.”70 Specifically,
the court found that the type of work was similar to “a controller, bookkeeper,
CFO, Treasurer, or similar function.”71
The court also analyzed whether the contract permitted Rosenberg to work
for an entity that was previously a “client of the practice,” or whether the CNC
prohibited this type of employment.72 Although the court agreed that in other
places in the contract the phrase “client of the practice” meant clients at the
time of the contract’s execution as well as future clients, the court refused to
apply this same meaning for the CNC clause.73 The court made this decision by
focusing on the definition of the word “is.”74 Applying the dictionary definition
of the term, the court found that it meant the present state of “be” or “to be.”75
This definition of the word “is” led the court to find that the CNC clause only
prohibited Rosenberg from working for clients who were presently clients of the
practice.76 The court then tied this interpretation to the “nature of the clause” and
concluded that Rosenberg did not breach the provision as a whole.77
Finally, the court discussed language that the parties could have included in
their agreement that would have avoided the litigation in this case.78 A lack of
clarifying language coupled with a lack of damage to Pope seem to fully justify
the court in its holding that no breach of the CNC occurred.79 Though never
explicitly stated, the court indicated its decision was based on what was fair to

Id. ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 829. The court lists several more rules, however this case note only
lists the three that relate to the discussion in the analysis section. See infra note 115–117 and
accompanying text.
69

70

Id. ¶ 25, 361 P.3d at 831.

71

Id. ¶ 26, 361 P.3d at 831.

72

Id. ¶ 25, 361 P.3d at 832.

See id. ¶¶ 25–28, 361 P.3d at 831–32 (stating that the CNC prohibits employment with
an entity which is, at that time, a “client of the practice.”).
73

74

Id. ¶ 28, 361 P.3d at 832.

Id. (citing Is, Webster’s New Dictionary
Third New International Dictionary (2002)).
75

76

Pope, ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.

77

Id. ¶ 30, 361 P.3d at 832.

78

Id. ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.

79

See id. ¶¶ 32–35, 361 P.3d at 832–34.

and
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the parties.80 Further, the court concluded that because the parties could have
agreed in advance to clarifying language, a reasonable interpretation required the
conclusion that the contract was not breached.81 Altogether, the interpretation,
the lack of clear language, and the policies behind the outcome led the court
to conclude that the district court correctly awarded summary judgment to
Rosenberg because she had not breached the CNC.82

C. Dissent
In Rosenberg, Justice Fox wrote a dissent, joined by Justice (Ret.) Kite, to
emphasize their view on the interpretation of the contract.83 The dissent argued
that good will plays a critical part in the sale of a business of this nature and that
Pope intended for the CNC to protect the business’s good will.84 Further, the dissent
discussed the majority’s erroneous use of the rules of contract interpretation.85
The dissent found that the totality of the circumstances “compel the conclusion
that the intent of the parties at the time the agreement was made was to prohibit
Ms. Rosenberg from” her employment with the firm’s client.86 Therefore, the
dissent argued that the majority should have interpreted the contract to prohibit
Rosenberg’s employment with the firm.87
In summary, the court in Rosenberg applied the rules of contract interpre
tation, analyzed the general fairness of the CNC clause and found Rosenberg
did not breach the contract.88 After Rosenberg, transactional attorneys must
consider how the Wyoming Supreme Court might analyze future litigation in
contract disputes. The decision by the court in this case, gives some insight into
this issue, but additionally leaves some gaps for how contracts can and should
be interpreted by a court.89 This article will now discuss these gaps and their
ramifications on transactional attorneys in the state.

IV. Analysis
By interpreting around the clear language of a CNC in the sale of a
business, the Wyoming Supreme Court unnecessarily added complications
80

Pope, ¶ 34, 361 P.3d at 834; See infra notes 101–102 and accompanying text.

81

See Pope, ¶¶ 32–35, 361 P.3d at 832–34.

82

Id. 361 P.3d at 832–34.

83

Id. ¶ 37, 361 P.3d at 834 (Fox, J. dissenting).

84

Id. ¶ 41, 361 P.3d at 834.

See id. ¶ 49, 361 P.3d at 837 (arguing that the holding in the case contravenes the principle
of avoiding interpretations of a contract that would render a provision meaningless).
85

86

Id. ¶ 44, 361 P.3d at 835.

87

Id. ¶ 51, 361 P.3d at 836.

88

See supra notes 76 –77.

89

See infra notes 90–148 and accompanying text.
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to the drafting of CNCs in contracts. Additionally, the court’s interpretation
nullifies the protection sought by Pope in executing the CNC with Rosenberg.90
In subsection A, this note will discuss how reasonableness played a role in the
court’s analysis and how it should have affected the court’s opinion.91 Subsection
B will explore the role of contract interpretation and its erroneous application in
this case.92 Finally, subsection C of the analysis will illustrate the ramifications
of the court’s holding in Rosenberg.93 These ramifications include, the increased
complexity in contract drafting, uncertainty as to contract interpretation an
therefore, an increase in litigation over CNC clauses, and a general decrease in
commerce activity associated with CNCs.94

A. The Court’s Opinion and the Reasonableness of the Clause
First, the reasonableness and fairness of the CNC clause in this case uniquely
influenced the court. The court began its opinion by setting the different standards
for CNC clauses in employment settings versus in the sale of businesses.95 The
court mentioned that in a sale of a business scenario, CNCs are less strictly
construed.96 In other words, CNC clauses in the sale of a business may be broader
in their reach and scope, than CNC clauses related to employment. This is
consistent with Wyoming case law.97 While this is the correct frame for analyzing
the CNC clause in this case, the court failed to address the issue until later in
the case.98
Although reasonableness was not the focus of the court’s opinion, the court
indicated that the reasonableness of the CNC was a part of its decision.99 After a
lengthy discussion of the interpretation of the language of the contract, the court
referred back to what validates a CNC which includes: protecting a legitimate
interest, reasonableness in scope, and reasonable hardship on the party against
whom it is enforced.100 Regarding Rosenberg’s employment with the former client,
the court stated that it failed to see a legitimate interest for Pope to protect.101
90

See infra notes 136 –137 and accompanying text.

91

See infra notes 95–113 and accompanying text.

92

See infra notes 114–139 and accompanying text.

93

See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text.

94

See infra notes 140–159 and accompanying text.

95

Pope v. Rosenberg, 2015 WY 142, ¶¶ 16–18, 361 P.3d 824, 829 (Wyo. 2015).

96

Id.

Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 20, 35 P.3d 409, 415 (Wyo. 2001); Ridley v. Krout,
63 Wyo. 252, 264, 180 P.2d 124, 127 (Wyo. 1947).
97

98

Pope, ¶¶ 34 –35, 361 P.3d at 834 –35.

99

Id.

100

Id. ¶ 33, 361 P.3d at 833.

101

Id. ¶¶ 33–34, 361 P.3d at 833–34.
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The court further concluded that prohibiting Rosenberg’s employment with
the former client would place her under unreasonable hardship.102 Both of these
factors, if significant enough, would invalidate a CNC.103 However, while giving
heavy weight to the interpretation of the contract, the court waited until the
end of its discussion to mention these otherwise deciding factors in cases dealing
with CNCs.104
Finally, the language in the decision discussing Pope’s damages indicated that
the court did what it believed was fair.105 Near the end of the court’s opinion, it
stated that Pope did not receive any damages, noting that this further supported
the court’s reasoning.106 However, the receipt of damages has nothing to do with
the validity of a CNC,107 nor was it in dispute in this case.108 The court reasoned
that Rosenberg’s employment with the District did not harm Pope in any way
because the client for whom Rosenberg was working no longer retained the
services of Pope.109 Therefore, although not directly addressed as such, fairness
seems to have influenced the court’s opinion.
Additionally, as mentioned earlier, the court incorrectly used the reasonable
ness test of CNCs in its analysis towards the end of its holding.110 The majority
of the court’s opinion discussed the interpretation of the contract executed by
Pope and Rosenberg with little regard for the reasonableness and fairness of
the CNC.111 The court only mentioned the reasonableness and fairness of the
contract in a brief comment at the end of the opinion.112 If the reasonableness
of the contract was at issue, then the court should have further developed the
reasonableness test in its analysis. Ultimately, if either reasonableness or fairness
was intended to be expressly apart of the court’s decision, it should have been
the focus, not merely a passing comment. Finally, if the court was determined
to interpret around the CNC, the court should have used the reasonableness test

102

Id. ¶ 33, 361 P.3d at 833.

103

See supra notes 44 – 45 and accompanying text.

104

Pope, ¶¶ 34–35, 361 P.3d at 833–34.

See id. ¶¶ 34–35, 361 P.3d at 833–34 (“[D]istrict court’s interpretation of the key clause
is thus supported by . . . the policies which would drive its construction if it were not clear.”
(emphasis added)).
105

106

Id. ¶¶ 34 –35, 361 P.3d at 833–34.

107

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 188 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).

108

Pope, ¶ 19, 361 P.3d at 830.

109

Id. ¶¶ 34–35, 361 P.3d at 833–34.

110

See supra notes 99 –103 and accompanying text.

111

See supra note 66 and accompanying text.

112

Pope, ¶¶ 34 –35, 361 P.3d at 833.
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and found the CNC invalid.113 Therefore, in this case, the court erroneously
utilized both, reasonableness and fairness factors.

B. The Court’s Erroneous Use of the Rules of Contract Interpretation
The second and most important issue on which the court focused was the
interpretation of the contract, specifically the CNC.114 In its opinion, the court
relied on the rules of contract interpretation to find that the contract permitted
the type of employment Rosenberg entered into with the District.115 In the case,
the court mentioned the necessary rules for contract interpretation.116 Wyoming
case law on the subject has developed each of these rules and they were correctly
stated by the court in this case.117
For the first rule of contract interpretation, the court mentioned the contract
must be interpreted in the same way that reasonable people would interpret it at
the time of formation.118 However, in this case, the court found that reasonable
persons would conclude that “client of the practice” only meant current clients,
yet it failed to provide an adequate explanation for such a conclusion.119 The
most that the court attributed to this outcome is the grammatical assembly of the
words and the definition of the word “is” to mean current clients, instead of the
firm’s current clients and clients at the time of signing.120 As discussed below, this
definition of the word “is” was subject to multiple interpretations, and therefore,
not a reasonable definition by the court to supports its interpretation.121
Additionally, the court reasoned that its interpretation was a reasonable
interpretation because (1) the contract gives Rosenberg more freedom in year six as
a CPA than as an office manager in year three (an area where there is no dispute by
either party), and (2) that Pope was not damaged by Rosenberg’s employment.122
Neither of these conclusions addressed what a reasonable person in either of the
See Holland v. Holland, 2001 WY 113, ¶ 13, 35 P.3d 409, 414 (Wyo. 2001); Ridley v.
Krout, 63 Wyo. 252, 264, 180 P.2d 124, 127 (Wyo. 1947); See Restatement (Second) of Contracts
§ 188 (Am. Law. Inst. 1981).
113

114

Pope, ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 830.

115

Id. ¶¶ 28–33, 361 P.3d at 832–33.

116

Id. ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 830.

See Whitney Holding Corp. v. Terry, 2012 WY 21, ¶ 18, 270 P.3d 662, 667 (Wyo.
2012); Claman v. Popp, 2012 WY 92, ¶ 28, 279 P.3d 1003, 1013 (Wyo. 2012); Ultra Res., Inc.,
v. Hartman, 2010 WY 36, ¶ 22, 226 P.3d 889, 905 (Wyo. 2010); Scherer v. Laramie Reg’l Airport
Bd., 2010 WY 105, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 996, 1003 (Wyo. 2010).
117

118

Pope, ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 830.

119

See id. ¶ 20, 29, 361 P.3d at 830, 832.

120

Id. ¶ 28, 361 P.3d at 832.

121

See infra notes 125 –128 and accompanying text.

122

See Pope, ¶¶ 34 –35, 361 P.3d at 833–34.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol17/iss2/7

12

Parks: CONTRACT LAW—To Compete or Not to Compete; Pope v. Rosenberg, 201

2017

Case Note

383

parties’ positions would have concluded the contract meant at the time of signing.
Rather, both conclusions address the reasonableness of the CNC itself, which as
discussed earlier, was also erroneous.123 Therefore, it must be concluded that the
court established its reasonable person interpretation of the contract either on an
arbitrary basis or simply as a post hoc rationalization of what it found to be fair.
Both rationales are incorrect for an application of this rule and undermine the
intent of at least one of the parties involved.
In applying the second rule of contract interpretation, the court stated that
the contract should be used to interpret itself.124 However, for the contract in this
case, the court failed to give a consistent definition of the phrase “client of the
practice.”125 Throughout the document, the phrase “client of the practice” had the
same interpretation, specifically, all current clients and clients at the time of the
signing of the contract.126 In spite of this consistent definition, the court found
that in the CNC, “client of the practice” did not extend to clients at the time of
signing and was limited to only the current clients at the time of litigation.127
The only explanation the court gave to its definition was the present tense use of
the term “is,” which limited the definition of “client of the practice” to current
clients.128 Therefore, the court gave the phrase a different definition, which
was inconsistent with the use of the same phrase throughout the contract.129 In
compliance with the above stated rule of contract interpretation, the court should
have interpreted the phrase “client of the practice” consistently and should have
found that this phrase extends to clients at the time of signing similar to the use
of the same phrase in other areas of the contract.
Finally, the court recognized that no provision of the contract should be
interpreted to render any other provision meaningless as a third rule for contract
interpretation.130 This principle of contract interpretation, though accurate,

123

See supra notes 105 –109 and accompanying text.

124

Pope, ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 830.

125

Id. ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.

Brief for Appellant at 6, 2015 WY 142, 361 P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S–14–0291),
2015 WL 1056234, at 7.
126

127
Pope, ¶ 28, 361 P.3d at 832. In this case, current clients refers to the clients of the firm when
the litigation started. This definition did not include clients at the time of the signing of the contract
to for the purchase of the firm by Pope. Pope’s argument was that the term “client of the practice”
should extend to the clients the firm had at the time of the signing of the contract to purchase the
firm. See Brief for Appellant at 17, 2015 WY 142, 361 P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291),
2015 WL 1056234 at 15.
128

Pope, ¶ 28, 361 P.3d at 832.

Pope, ¶ 45, 361 P.3d 835 (Fox, J. dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 18, 2015 WY 142, 361
P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291), 2015 WL 1056234 at 18.
129

Pope, ¶ 20, 361 P.3d at 830 (citing Scherer v. Laramie Reg’l Airport Bd., 2010 WY 105, ¶
11, 236 P.3d 996, 1003 (Wyo, 2010)).
130
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did little to affect the decision of the court in this case.131 The court accurately
stated this rule and others, but did not adhere to them in its interpretation of the
contract.132 Based on the court’s interpretation, the part of the contract that was
contingent upon the phrase “client of the practice” indirectly served no purpose
for clients who simply terminate the firm’s services.133 Courts in Wyoming are
and should be reluctant to interpret parts of a contract in such a way as to render
other provisions meaningless.134 Therefore, the court should have used this rule
to interpret the phrase “client of the practice” to include clients at the time of the
signing of the contract.
Further, the court’s interpretation of the phrase “client of the practice” is not
only up for reasonable dispute, as evident by the dissent and the litigation itself,
but it is also not a reasonable definition of the term.135 If Pope only intended to
protect against competition from Rosenberg with any current clients, and not
the clients present at the time of signing, Pope’s firm would not have any real
protection at all.136 All that it would take for Rosenberg to work in competition
is for a client to terminate its services with the firm and rehire Rosenberg.137
Therefore, this interpretation was not reasonable and certainly disputable. Thus,
the court should not have interpreted the contract in the manner it did based on
this rule of contract interpretation.
In conclusion, even though the court listed the correct rules of contract
interpretation, the court incorrectly applied these rules and ultimately reached
an incorrect result.138 If the court was convinced that the CNC in this case was
unreasonable or should have been invalid, then the court should have focused on
that issue. However, the court incorrectly used the rules of contract interpretation
to reach what it seemingly found to be a reasonable or fair decision.139 Therefore,

See Pope, ¶¶ 20, 49, 361 P.3d at 830, 836. (Fox, J., dissenting) (finding the phrase “client
of the practice” in the CNC to have a different definition than the same phrase elsewhere in
the document).
131

132

Id.

Pope, ¶ 49, 361 P.3d at 836 (Fox, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 20, 2015 WY 142,
361 P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291), 2015 WL 1056234 at 22.
133

134
See Scherer v. Laramie Reg’l Airport Bd., 2010 WY 105, ¶ 11, 236 P.3d 996, 1003 (Wyo.
2010); Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, ¶ 40, 201 P.3d 1127, 1138 (Wyo. 2009); Wyo. Game &
Fish Comm’n v. Mills Co., 701 P.2d 819, 822 (Wyo. 1985).
135

Id. ¶ 49, 361 P.3d at 836 (Fox, J., dissenting).

Pope, ¶ 49, 361 P.3d 836 (Fox, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 20, 2015 WY 142, 361
P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291), 2015 WL 1056234;
136

Pope, ¶ 49, 361 P.3d 836 (Fox, J., dissenting); Brief for Appellant at 20, 2015 WY 142, 361
P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291), 2015 WL 1056234.
137

138

See supra notes 118–134 and accompanying text.

139

Id. ¶ 34, 361 P.3d at 833.
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the court, with its ultimate decision in mind, appears to have used the rules of
contract interpretation as a post hoc rationalization to meet that decision, and its
decision has ramifications for Wyoming practitioners.

C. Ramifications of the Court’s Holding
The court’s holding in Pope v. Rosenberg has several ramifications on the
function of transactional attorneys in Wyoming. These ramifications include:
(1) further complications and language to add to CNC clauses in contracts,
(2) uncertainty about when the court will arbitrarily adversely interpret
seemingly clear language in a CNC clause, (3) an increase in contract disputes,
and (4) less willingness to enter into CNCs, reducing potential opportunities for
the sale of business and employment to which CNCs are essential.
First, based on the court’s opinion, transactional attorneys must consider
additional language in the contracts they draft to avoid this situation.140
When drafting contracts, attorneys rely on judicial certainty.141 When a court’s
interpretation of an issue upends judicial certainty, attorneys must adjust their
drafting for their contracts to remain effective.142 In the present case, the court
stated that the CNC could have contained the correct language to prohibit
any litigation by clearly representing to both parties what the CNC allowed.143
However, this advice from the court offers little help or consolation to the losing
party. It is reasonable to assume that neither party envisioned litigation when
they entered into the CNC. Realistically, both parties likely presumed, prior
to their litigation, that the language already clearly contained the appropriate
language. The court could always easily point out additional language needed to
avoid litigation.144 Yet, the court failed to consider how its holding in this case
further complicates drafting contracts. In light of Rosenberg, attorneys now need
to consider what additional language CNCs should contain to not only avoid a
similar situation but also to avoid further litigation related to a court’s various
interpretations.145 This result will only add to the complexity and language that
CNCs contain, including the language the court spelled out in this case.146 As the
need for additional complexity and language in CNCs increases, so will the time
and expenses of contract drafting for all parties involved.

140

Id. ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.

Diana Lourdes Dick, Confronting the Certainty Imperative in Corporate Finance Juris
prudence, 2011 Utah L. Rev. 1461, 1466, (2011).
141

142

Id.

143

Pope, ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.

144

Id.

145

Id. ¶ 49, 361 P.3d at 836.

146

Id. ¶ 32, 361 P.3d at 832.
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The second ramification resulting from the court’s holding is a lack of
certainty as to how courts in Wyoming will interpret CNCs in contracts.147 As
discussed previously, one of the factors that causes contract complexity is judicial
uncertainty.148 In this case, the court incorrectly used the rules of contract
interpretation to reach a result that Pope’s contract drafters could not have
foreseen. In other words, when Pope was drafting the CNC, he reasonably
thought the language was clear as to what the CNC authorized and what it did
not. After all, if Pope, as a sophisticated party, did not think the language was
clear, he likely would have changed the language to make it clear.149 However,
the court found the CNC allowed an action by Rosenberg that Pope thought
the CNC clearly prohibited.150 This contrary finding by the court only adds
to the uncertainty as to how courts in Wyoming will interpret CNCs, further
complicating the drafting of CNCs.151 Ultimately, the lack of certainty as to
a court’s interpretation of CNC clauses is the stepping stone to the final two
ramification resulting from this case.
A third ramification of the court’s decision is an increase in litigation reducing
judicial economy. In other words, there will be an increase in litigation over the
language in a contract as parties to a contract see the way the court interpreted
the language of the contract in this case.152 Formal methods of judicial interpre
tation are in place to reduce litigation and promote judicial economy.153
Therefore, when a court diverts from the correct use of these methods, judicial
dockets fill up.154 By diverting from the correct use of the rules of contract
interpretation in Rosenberg, courts in the state of Wyoming can expect a decrease
in judicial economy.
Finally, the uncertainty created by the Rosenberg court will discourage business
deals that depend on CNCs, specifically when drafters rely on the formal rules of
See generally Juliet P. Kostritsky, Interpretive Risk and Contract Interpretation: A Suggested
Approach for Maximizing Value, 2 Elon. L. Rev. 109, 113 (2011) (“[C]ourts overstep when they
resort to interpreting contracts by overriding the parties’ chosen means . . . to implement specific
objectives as a form of ex post equitable adjustment.”).
147

148

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

See Brief for Appellant at 17, 2015 WY 142, 361 P.3d 824 (Wyo. 2015) (No. S-14-0291)
at 18, 2015 WL 1056234 (pointing out the only clients the firm considered during the sale were the
ones at the time of signing).
149

See Pope, ¶ 35, 361 P.3d at 834 (finding the district court’s interpretation of the CNC
against Pope correct).
150

151

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

See generally, Daniel D. Barnhizer, Context as Power: Defining the Field of Battle for Advantage in Contractual Interactions, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 607, 612 (2010) (“Courts, whether
adopting high-context or low-context contract dispute resolution strategies (‘HCS’ and ‘LCS,’
respectively), must limit the scope of contextual inquiry, even if only for judicial economy.”).
152

153

Id. at 612.

154

See id.
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contract interpretation.155 In the law of contracts, those relying on a promise must
be able to expect the fulfillment of that promise.156 Without judicial certainty,
contract drafters must face the possibility that the rules of contract interpretation,
as developed by Wyoming case law, will not be applied to the interpretation of
certain contracts. Contract drafters will also be concerned that certain competition
they sought to avoid, is still permissible despite their CNCs. Both valid, potential
concerns will discourage business situations in which CNCs are essential and as a
result, commerce in general.
These four ramifications from the court’s holding in Rosenberg are issues that
cannot be ignored by transactional attorneys. Understanding the potential need
for additional language in a contract with a CNC may prevent future litigation.157
Realizing a lack of judicial certainty related to the interpretation contracts,
in general, and specifically, CNCs, may cause businesses to restructure their
transactions in an effort to avoid the need for CNCs.158 Finally, the Wyoming
Supreme Court should consider how its decision might increase litigation related
to the interpretation of contracts and CNCs.159 Any transactional attorney must
carefully consider each contractual transaction in light of these ramifications from
the holding in Rosenberg.

V. Conclusion
Based on its holding in Pope v. Rosenberg, the Wyoming Supreme Court
unnecessarily added complications to the drafting of non-compete clauses in
contracts by interpreting around the clear language of a non-compete clause in the
sale of a business.160 To promote commerce, and otherwise improbable business
decisions, contract drafters must be able to predict how courts will interpret
the language of the contracts they draft.161 According to Murray on Contracts,
“Contract[s] determine[] how persons and resources are brought together in
the productive and allocation processes.”162 Therefore, contracts, in general, are
essential to the economy of a society.163 With decisions as in Rosenberg, contract

155
See Larry A. DiMatteo, The Norms of Contract: The Fairness Inquiry and the “Law of
Satisfaction”—A Nonunified Theory, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 349, 370 (1995) (“[T]he loser in this
scenario is, . . . the resulting benefits of predictability and certainty.”).
156

Corbin on Contracts § 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo, rev. ed. 2016).

157

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

158

See supra note 155 and accompanying text.

159

See supra note 152 and accompanying text.

160

See supra notes 141–157 and accompanying text

161

Corbin, supra note 156, § 1.1.

162

John Edward Murray, Murray on Contracts § 5 (5th ed. 2011).

163

Id.
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drafting becomes more difficult and complex.164 In Rosenberg, the court seemed
to fail to consider the ramifications of its decision to decide what it, no doubt,
thought was reasonable. By concluding that Rosenberg’s action did not violate the
CNC, the court nullified the very purpose of the clause. The court’s decision in
Rosenberg further complicates the drafting of CNCs in Wyoming and discourages
business situations which rely on CNCs.

164

See supra notes 140 –159 and accompanying text.
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